and 1996 were among the lowest in U.S. history. 1 The rational economic explanation emphasizes the fact that growing affluence raises opportunity costs, which make voting and other forms of political participation less attractive and less
likely. An elaboration of this view comes from both Charles Tiebout's classic concept of "voting with your feet" 2 and Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty. 3 As exit options become affordable for more people, there will be less voice and less interest in conventional politics. Current and past trends in residential location echo this point. Planners proposing tougher land-use regulations in the name of preventing urban sprawl should take note.
Affluence makes mobility an option for increasing numbers of people. Debates over the pervasiveness of these phenomena have recently surfaced in discussions of whether more Americans than ever are now Bowling Alone.
community and social capital, his critics suggest that he has been looking in all the wrong places; the Kiwanis Club's membership may be down but the Sierra Club's membership is way up. 5 Others suggest that it is entirely reasonable for people to "substitute freedom of choice for the binding power of custom and tradition." 6 We live in a world of trade-offs.
In the next section, we discuss the federal role in land-use planning. We
then briefly discuss what we call the two migrations in the United States. Large numbers of people are engaged in two forms of exit, moving into private communities and/or into suburban/exurban locations where they expect more direct and personal control over their property. Afterwards, we revisit the sprawl debate to reiterate our position that the arguments used by planners and others for vastly enhanced public land-use controls are weak. In the concluding section, we discuss the irony of proposals for stronger state controls at a time when people are looking for property-rights assurances that they find more attractive.
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN LAND-USE PLANNING
In recent years, there have been many state, county, and local ballot initiatives about growth management, "smart growth," and sprawl. In the past two elections (1998 and 2000) , the majority of the initiatives to control sprawl passed. 7 Yet, there Page 5 of 39 remain many jurisdictions that refused to accept a growth-management agenda, and an even larger number that did not get involved in the debate and were willing to accept development, even remaining enthusiastic about it. The result is that, regardless how fast the sprawl-containment strategy spreads, there are always cities and counties where development can take place. Thus, the anti-sprawl movement recognized that the way to control this was to press for state legislation. This Even with a state-mandated growth-management strategy, it is difficult to control development in all jurisdictions because most statutes cannot avoid leaving some there are thousands of independent homebuilders who succeed only if they meet consumers' demands. They have little choice but to be responsive to people's preferences for local public goods and to their demand for assurances of neighborhood quality and good governance. This is the key to economic efficiency.
In Zoning and Property Rights, Robert Nelson argues that the current interest in private zoning can also be explained by the inherent problems of conventional politicized zoning. Zoning rights (to be more precise, neighborhood collective-property rights) are routinely, if informally, transacted. Developers usually gain development rights if they agree to certain payments (usually for infrastructure improvements) and related concessions. It is not surprising that many of them also make substantial political contributions, treated as a cost of doing business. Nelson points out that these transactions are to be expected but that they are inefficient. Greater efficiency is available if communities could bargain directly with developers without the involvement of a third-party zoning board. In fact, he suggests that widespread NIMBY attitudes are the result of the property owners' mistrust of the zoning board's ability to adequately represent owners' interests (economists refer to this as an "agency" problem). If third-party zoning boards cannot be trusted, then the best deal is no deal.
Similarly, Robert Ellickson 25 suggests changes in state laws that would make it easier to form Block Improvement Districts, making the advantages of private government available to many who are less mobile in older neighborhoods. 26 He proposes this as a way to strengthen social cohesion and civic society in the inner city.
Developers' commitments are often more credible than those of politicians. None of this should be surprising. Even where private zoning is not available, private services appear where public provision is problematic. Jitneys (though often illegal) supplement public transit in most large U.S. cities; many families now avail themselves of private schools or home-schooling (which is facilitated by a growing number of websites designed to help them); and more is now spent on private security services than on federal, state, and local police. 29 Current discussions of "urban sprawl" almost inevitably lead to recommendations of ways in which public zoning and regulation can be strengthened (often via proposals to make it a statewide or "regional" function) 30 at a time when people, voting with their feet and with their pocketbooks, are would do little to change the metropolitan landscape. 38 The reason is that the urban capital stock is already largely in place and changes very slowly. As for the elsewhere. The explanation of this last point is obvious; the accessibility and mobility needs of individuals cannot be satisfied by constraining them to inside the community, at least within walking distance.
Tripmaking. A major claim of the New Urbanists is that their proposals will lead to major changes in travel behavior: reduced automobile dependence, more transit use, increased bicycling, and a pedestrian-friendly development.
Unfortunately, there is little justification for these claims. A high proportion of trips is external to the community (for instance, almost all jobs are outside), and cars remain necessary for mobility. No significant transit services have been developed to link New Urbanist communities with nearby centers; for example, the plans for a transit system to link Laguna West with Sacramento (about 10 miles away) never materialized. The majority opinion is that the New Urbanist communities will never be dense enough or large enough to justify significant (i.e. frequent) transit service. 47 Duany admits that market preferences, heterogeneous housing demands, and the open-space provisions that drastically reduce gross compared with net residential densities result in relatively low densities compared with transit-oriented neighborhoods. Careful analysis of the tripmaking impacts 48 suggests that it is unclear whether higher density communities will result in more 52 Reforestation in America is the result of greater agricultural efficiencies leading farmers to farm only their best land. 53 The amount of farmland would be even less in the absence of federal programs that pay handsomely for "farmlands" not farmed. Even where everything is within walking distance and everyone rides bicycles, people continue to drive their automobiles, and often. Household trip frequencies are often the wild card. It is by no means clear that these remain unchanged when access is improved. It is more likely that Americans will buy more as the price drops. 58 The federal Clean Air Act mandates higher densities, and federal, state, and local planning agencies promote compact land-use arrangements in the belief that these will contribute to less auto use and cleaner air.
Yet the theory behind this multi-billion effort remains weak.
5. Inner city poverty is not a consequence of low-density suburbs. 59 Poverty is a human capital problem exacerbated by poor inner city schools.
Moreover, equity loses out when controls limit housing availability and push up prices. It is no accident that the planners' showcase (Portland, Oregon) is now among the least affordable of U.S. cities in housing, with the fastest-growing house prices in the 1990s. 60 A related issue is how the costs and benefits of alternative settlement patterns are distributed. The brute fact is that there are, in most cases, gainers and losers from any market or institutional change. The point is that market forces minimize costs to losers. Yes, CIDs may be more expensive, and the poor may not have access, but the suburban exit has created significant housing opportunities for central-city households.
6. There are no clear infrastructure savings from high residential densities.
The few available studies reveal a "U-shaped" cost function that bottoms at relatively low residential densities, below 1250 people per square mile. 61 Scale economies in areas such as power generation are probably a thing of the past. In any event, cost minimization is not the full story. People compare and trade off marginal costs with marginal benefits whenever they can. The arguments for more land-use controls are, of course, much more extensive (some are even silly, such as the assertion that Atlantans are the most obese because of that city's suburban sprawl, a hypothesis that has inspired research projects at the Centers for Disease Control). 66 The current favorite is "global warming" with proposals that seek to implement drastic lifestyle changes to counter it ("get people out of their cars"). Yet the evidence for climate change remains very controversial, 67 and the cost-benefit ratios of the policy proposals from the Kyoto Conference have been seriously questioned. Another issue is the relative importance of increasing land-use consumption per household relative to population growth as the major contributors to sprawl. This is a recurrent internal debate among anti-sprawl analysts that is, for example, tearing the Sierra Club apart. Some argue that land use is four times as important as population growth 68 .
Others argue that population growth accounts for more than one-half of the problem. 69 Still others find significant variations among individual metropolitan areas. 70 Some of the confusion relates to a temporary glitch in the 1997 land-use database from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Inventory.
Because this is an internal discussion among those who take a different position on land-use controls, we remain neutral, except when they take the leap from population growth is the problem to immigration is the problem. In our view, the cliché that the United States is a "nation of immigrants" does not do full justice to the net benefits conferred on society as a whole and to individuals from recent immigration. is declining. 72 This occurs in spite of much tougher policies than in the U.S.
designed to promote the opposite trends. Rather than pursuing the hopeless goal of getting people to give up strongly preferred freedoms and lifestyles, U.S. planners may want to ponder how they can increase their effectiveness by doing less.
Finally, how does all this affect federalism and related issues? First, the federal government is a bystander in all this unless it can create a wedge issue (e.g., air quality, water quality, endangered species, or central-city disinvestment) to justify intervention on other grounds. Second, with respect to intergovernmental relations, the arena is a debate between states and local jurisdictions, with the federal government almost irrelevant. Third, in our view, the constitutional issues that emphasize individual rights are the most critical. The sprawl debate, at it's most fundamental level, hinges on whether one believes that people have the right to choose where they want to live, what they want to drive, where they want to shop, and soon --if they are willing to pay the full costs involved.
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